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Holy War by Other Means
Jake Mezey, Yale University
 The medieval crusades in the Middle East are often 
regarded in popular culture, and by some historians, as a period 
of purely violent and fanatical conflict. The Catholic Church 
preached holy wars from the 11th to 14th century, resulting 
in the slaughter of thousands of Muslims, Jews, and Christians 
in modern day Palestine, Eastern Europe, and throughout the 
Mediterranean world. The Seljuks, Ayyubids, and Mameluks led 
similarly devastating wars to repulse the crusades and conquer 
the Latin kingdoms established in Palestine. In these wars, 
these groups invoked jihad, the concept of religious struggle. In 
reality, however, the political and cultural interactions between 
European “Franks” and local Muslims were far more nuanced. 
Franks and Muslims lived in the same cities, traded with each 
other in the same markets, and occasionally married each other. 
The architecture and art of the medieval Middle East reflects 
a highly cosmopolitan array of influences, including those 
of Western Europe in many surviving castles and churches. 
Muslim historian Usama ibn Munqidh frequently condemned 
the crusaders he fought against, while also noting the friends 
and allies he made among the Franks.1 Among other kinds 
of nonviolent cultural exchange, diplomatic negotiation and 
alliances between Frankish and Muslim rulers were a vital aspect 
of the political landscape of the holy land during the crusades.
 The diplomatic relations between Franks and Muslims 
during the Crusades raise questions about how the Crusaders 
understood the concept of holy war. If we believe that crusaders 
single-mindedly viewed the holy land as belonging to Christianity 
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and the Muslims living there as evil heathens, then how can we 
explain the alliance of Tancred of Antioch with Ridwan of Aleppo 
against the combined forces of Baldwin II and Jawali Saqwa?2 
Traditional scholarship on the Crusades has often shied away 
from examining the prevalence of political cooperation across 
cultural lines and its implications for crusader motivations. One 
camp, however, has emerged, which takes the politically expedient 
treaties signed between Muslim and Frankish rulers as evidence 
that purely material rather than religious motivations were 
central to the crusades. While this interpretation could explain 
many alliances and treaties between Christian and Muslims 
individually, it ignores the context that generated the crusading 
movement in the first place, and more importantly the centrality 
of religious objectives in many of the political negotiations of 
crusaders. That being said, holy war ideology was not so rigid as 
to prevent multiple alliances between crusader and Muslim rulers 
or peace treaties that compromised on control of religious sites 
or allowed for the religious freedom of the local population. This 
paper will examine the sources and limits of political negotiation 
between crusaders and Muslim rulers by focusing on three 
representative examples of diplomacy during several periods. 
First, the relationship between the rulers of Antioch and Aleppo 
after the First Crusade highlights the integration of the crusader 
states into the existing Syrian political landscape. Second, the 
peace negotiations between Richard I and Saladin illustrate how 
military necessity shaped negotiations during the Third Crusade. 
Finally, Frederick II’s successful negotiations with Al-Kamil and 
the peaceful transfer of Jerusalem to Christian control in 1229 
serves as the most striking examples of cooperation in the face 
of ideological conflict between a European and Muslim ruler 
during the crusades. I propose an understanding of the crusades 
as a process of balancing political interests within a religious 
framework and reconciling reality with ideology.
 The only book entirely dedicated to the history of 
diplomacy during the crusades is Michael Köhler’s work Alliances 
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and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle 
East: Cross-cultural Diplomacy in the Period of the Crusades. As a 
result, this paper is heavily influenced by that book’s arguments 
but differs on several key points. Köhler argues that the crusader 
states were quickly incorporated as another facet into the natural 
political structure that already existed in the Levant. This 
argument I fully support, but Köhler goes on to use the wealth 
of realist negotiations as evidence against religious motivations 
on the part of the Europeans. Köhler’s book points out the 
purely material interests of Frankish rulers who he suggests were 
mostly trying to seize land and political power. I argue that 
spiritual motivations were in fact central to the crusades and 
that cross-cultural political negotiation also reflected an internal 
negotiation between conflicting ideals and realities. Crusaders 
believed in a clear delineation between Christian and heathen 
and in a divine mandate to conquer the holy land, but once they 
reached Palestine, political realities had to be incorporated into 
their conception of what it meant to take the cross. 
 Yvonne Friedman has written two insightful articles 
on the role of alliances and treaties within a religious context. 
The first article deals with acceptable and unacceptable alliances 
between Franks and Muslims and the second on the negotiation 
of peace treaties. I draw heavily on two of her main theories. 
First, alliances between Muslims and Christians were viewed as 
treasonous in some cases, but in other cases they were successfully 
reconciled with religious ideology.3 Second, peaceful exchange 
between Muslims and Christians had to be explicitly explained 
and justified within the crusader ethos, while warfare did not.4 
This paper seeks to build on Friedman’s work and examine the 
process by which crusaders reconciled their religious ideology 
with diplomacy.
 Thomas Asbridge’s 2013 article in the Journal of Medieval 
Studies explores the role of negotiation between Richard I and 
Saladin. Asbridge shows that diplomacy during the Third 
Crusade often served to garner military advantages or to gain a 
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stronger negotiating position. He goes on to argue that Richard 
I showed far more diplomatic subtlety and skill than previous 
scholars had recognized.5 Asbridge’s article, along with Yvonne 
Friedman’s previously mentioned works, are the foundation of 
the argument put forward in this paper that diplomatic measures 
served as an extension of holy war on another front during the 
Third Crusade.  
 Hiroshi Takayama’s article on the reasons behind Frederick 
II’s choice to negotiate rather than fight with Al-Kamil has been 
incredibly important to the understanding of the Sixth Crusade. 
Takayama places Frederick’s expedition within the context of 
his long-standing diplomatic relationship and friendship with 
Al-Kamil, which preceded his actual journey to the Middle 
East in 1229.6 Takayama identifies several key factors that 
influenced Frederick’s decision to pursue a diplomatic approach 
to crusading, particularly Fredericks’s cosmopolitan upbringing 
in Sicily. In this paper, I identify Frederick II as the crusader 
leader who was able to reconcile diplomacy and religion to the 
greatest degree, and I draw on Takayama’s analysis to explain the 
personal factors that allowed him to negotiate successfully across 
cultures. Furthermore, I build on Takayama’s argument that 
Frederick’s motivations were religious rather than simple political 
opportunism. 
 The lack of original treaties poses a major challenge to 
the study of diplomacy between Franks and Muslims during 
the crusades. Most of the agreements between rulers may never 
have been widely copied, were mostly conducted through spoken 
negotiation, and were "signed" only with verbal swearing of oaths. 
Therefore, the majority of primary sources available are Latin 
and Arabic historians who provide an account of negotiations 
conducted many years in the past, for which they were often not 
present. Despite this challenge, we can still study the reaction, 
memory, and political effects of cross-cultural diplomacy during 
the crusades. In many ways, the subjective accounts of medieval 
historians are key to understanding the struggles faced in 
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portraying the religious nature of warfare alongside the limited 
and material compromises that each side made with their supposed 
enemies. 
 After the successes of the First Crusade (1096-1099), its 
leaders established the “Outremer,” a series of Latin kingdoms on 
the Mediterranean coast. These kingdoms existed, in one form 
or another, from 1099 until the city of Acre fell in 1291, ending 
major crusading in Palestine. For nearly 200 years, however, these 
crusader states and their rulers had to navigate the complex network 
of alliances and rivals that formed the local political landscape. 
Even as these states retained the religious ideology that they had 
been founded upon, they also actively allied with Muslim rulers 
and engaged in war against common enemies. The First Crusade 
owed its very success, in part, to the divided nature of the Seljuk 
Turkish principalities in the region and the ability of the crusaders 
to exploit these divisions.7 Political conflicts after the First Crusade 
also included rivalries among the crusader states, especially as 
the Kingdom of Jerusalem attempted to assert its authority over 
the other states of the Outremer. The clash between a realpolitik 
approach to diplomacy and the religious crusader ethos was 
particularly apparent in the Principality of Antioch. After the fall 
of the County of Edessa, Antioch was the frontier of the Crusader 
States and was both a frequent enemy and sometimes ally of its 
Muslim neighbor Aleppo. 
 Bohemond of Taranto and his Italian Norman entourage 
became rulers of the city of Antioch after the Crusaders defeated 
the besieging forces of Kerbogah in 1098.8 For the next 30 years, 
Bohemond, and his nephew Tancred, expanded and consolidated 
their control over the surrounding territory, capturing towns and 
playing off rivalries between Muslim rulers. The primary power 
relationship in North Western Syria became that of Antioch and 
Aleppo. The two cities, and under their respective rulers, vied for 
control over the collection of towns and castles between them 
while simultaneously attempting to maintain their independence 
from the influence of outside forces. 
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 In 1098, Godfrey of Bouillon, who had occupied the 
town of Tell Bashir, was approached by Umar, the Muslim ruler 
of the town of Azaz. Umar had rebelled against Ridwan, the 
ruler of Aleppo, and needed help from the crusaders to repel 
Ridwan’s punitive attack.9 Albert of Aachen records that Umar 
initially approached Godfrey through a local Syrian Christian, 
but it was after Umar sent his son as a negotiator and hostage 
that Godfrey agreed to conclude an alliance and come to his 
aid.10 Godfrey had to convince the other leaders of the crusade 
in Antioch, Bohemond of Taranto and Raymond of Toulouse, to 
assist him in his alliance with Umar. The  two lords were hesitant 
to ally themselves with a Muslim, so Godfrey had to use religious 
imagery to prompt them to assist him, arguing that helping these 
Turks would please God.11 Bohemond and Raymond likely were 
reluctant to leave Antioch as they were still vying for control of 
the city at the time and also may have been jealous of Godfrey’s 
opportunity to establish a foothold in Northern Syria. Along 
with his religious urgings, Godfrey threatened to refuse aid to 
either of them in the future if they refused to participate now.12 
This combination eventually prompted the rival leaders to jointly 
defeat the forces of Ridwan besieging Azaz, leading Umar to 
concluded a treaty of alliance with Godfrey. 
 The defense of Azaz is the first example of a direct military 
alliance between Crusaders and Muslims and suggests a number 
of conclusions. First, even as early as 1098, the leaders of the 
First Crusade were willing to make an alliance with a Muslim 
ruler. Rather than simply concluding a peace treaty or extracting 
tribute, Godfrey, Bohemond, and Raymond, actively cooperated 
with Umar. Secondly, the Franks were nearly immediately 
drawn into the dynamics of local Syrian politics and rivalries. 
While the appearance of the Crusaders was met with force by 
the rulers whose principalities they threatened, their presence 
also provided opportunities for dissatisfied tributaries like Umar 
to find new allies to support their rebellions. Finally, personal 
gain or advantage and religious ideology do not seem to have 
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been mutually exclusive to the leaders of the First Crusade. 
argued that assistance to one group of Muslim Turks against 
another was included in their divine mandate to retake the holy 
land. At the same time, he made appeals to the other leaders’ 
personal glory and threats about their future political alliances. 
Since Godfrey was unafraid to openly state political threats, his 
spiritual message was likely not pure propaganda. Considering 
the context of the initial calling of the First Crusade, it is hard to 
believe that the crusaders used religion as a simple dog-whistle. It 
is also undeniable that nearly all the leaders of the First Crusade 
were interested in personal gain and glory. The squabble between 
Bohemond and Raymond over Antioch, and Baldwin I’s 
expedition to seize Edessa attests to the importance of territorial 
gain for the crusading elite.13 We must conclude, therefore, that 
these were not necessarily contradictory motivations and the 
crusaders believed that conquering the Holy Land for Christianity 
also meant conquering it for themselves. 
Map of the four Crusader states after the First Crusade
 The peace signed by Bohemond and Ridwan of Aleppo in 
1103 offers another example of the presence of religion in treaty-
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making between crusaders and Muslims after the First Crusade. 
Alarmed at the expansion of Antioch’s power, Ridwan negotiated 
a truce by paying Bohemond 7,000 dinars and ten horses in 
exchange for the release of Muslim prisoners.14 Furthermore, Ibn 
Shaddad reported that the treaty also required that a cross be 
mounted on a minaret of the citadel’s mosque.15 Supposedly, the 
cross was later moved with the permission of the crusaders to a 
local church in Aleppo, where it was recorded as late as 1124.16 
While this detail of the treaty between Bohemond and Ridwan 
remains unverified by other sources, it provides an example of 
religious negotiation intertwined with political negotiation. 
Being momentarily in the stronger position, Bohemond forced a 
Christian symbol on Aleppo as a sign of the crusaders’ claim to 
the region. The fact that the cross was the symbolic priority for 
Bohemond, rather than a coat of arms, is evidence he conceived 
his own conquests as an extension of holy war. If, however, he 
really did allow the cross to be moved from the mosque to a 
church, it shows a remarkable adaptability of ideology to the 
necessities of peacemaking. If Bohemond was worried that he 
may have overreached and endangered the truce by forcing the 
cross into such a public and symbolically important position, it 
makes sense that he might quietly have agreed to move it to save 
the treaty. It is worth noting that most sources only record the 
monetary payment in exchange for prisoners. It would not be 
surprising, however, if the negotiations around the placement of 
the cross in the city were kept somewhat discrete in the written 
record, since the presence and removal of the cross would be 
embarrassing to both sides. Even though this truce was signed in 
1103, it would not be until after the battle of Harran in 1104 that 
a more lasting agreement was negotiated and active cooperation 
began between Antioch and Aleppo. 
 During the Battle of Harran, Baldwin II Count of Edessa 
was captured and fell into the hands of Jawali Saqwa of Mosul.17 
Bohemond preceded to attempt a crusade against the Byzantine 
Empire, leaving his nephew Tancred as regent of Antioch. Tancred 
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was also selected as regent of Edessa. As such, Tancred had little 
desire to help secure Baldwin’s freedom, preferring instead to try 
and consolidate his hold on the two principalities.18 Baldwin was 
ransomed the latter wanted to take control of Aleppo.19 According 
to different sources, Tancred either refused to return control of 
Edessa to Baldwin II, returned the city but tried to hold onto 
some of the surrounding land, or would only return the county 
in exchange for an oath of vassalage from Baldwin.20 Regardless, 
this dispute triggered a conflict between Tancred and Baldwin 
at the same time that Jawali threatened Aleppo. Despite the fact 
that arbitration in 1108 by the patriarch of Antioch restored 
Edessa to him,  subsequently assisted Jawali in an attack against 
Ridwan of Aleppo due to the oath he had sworn on release.21 
Ridwan convinced Tancred to take his side against Jawali and 
Baldwin by arguing that if Jawali captured Aleppo, Antioch 
would be next. The result was an alliance of Tancred of Antioch 
with Ridwan of Aleppo against Baldwin of Edessa and Jawali 
of Mosul in 1109. The two sides met in battle somewhere near 
Tell Bashir, and Tancred and Ridwan were victorious.22 Later that 
year at a council of crusader leaders, Tancred and Baldwin were 
reconciled, but their rivalry persisted until Tancred’s death in 
1112. 
 This episode, which is corroborated by multiple Arabic 
and Latin sources, reveals the full extent of cross-cultural alliances 
immediately after the First Crusade and the factors that shaped 
them. Not only did both Baldwin and Tancred form military 
alliances with Muslim rulers who they had previously fought, but 
when their personal rivalry coincided with conflict between their 
allies, they actively fought on opposite sides of the battlefield. In 
fact, Baldwin is reported to have executed a Christian convert in 
Saruj who had offended his allies under Jawali.23 Hillenbrand and 
Köhler note how individual political maneuvering superseded 
religious differences in the period after the First Crusade, and 
local Turkish rulers were more likely to use the crusader states 
to shore up their own principalities than to try and destroy 
148    Jake Mezey
Holy War by Other Means
them outright.24 Ibn Abi Tayyi records Ridwan as saying that if 
Jawali takes Aleppo, “there remains for the Franks, together with 
himself [Ridwan], no longer a place in Syria.” Köhler emphasizes 
this idea of “no place” as the key to the formations of nearly all 
subsequent alliances between neighboring crusader and Muslim 
states.25 The rise of an outside eastern power, often originating 
from Mosul, would prompt the warring states of Syria to join 
together to preserve their independence. This pattern would 
be repeated throughout the 12th century, exemplified by the 
alliance between the crusader states, specifically the Kingdom of 
Jerusalem, with Damascus against the threat of Zengi in 1137.26 
Köhler argues that the crusaders were fully integrated into the 
political landscape of Syria and behaved according to the same 
dynamics that had persisted in the area before their arrival. It is, 
however, important to examine details that might complicate the 
portrayal of the crusader states as indistinguishable from previous 
polities and unaffected by religious conflict.  
 Fulcher of Chartres claims that Tancred won with the 
“help of God.”27 Matthew of Edessa notes Tancred pious character, 
and goes on to say that Baldwin’s actions were wicked in the eyes 
of God, most likely for his alliance with Jawali.28 Despite the 
fact that Tancred illegally withheld Edessa from Baldwin, he was 
praised by contemporary sources while Baldwin was condemned. 
Asbridge suggests that since Baldwin was the first to associate 
with a Turkish ally, he was blamed in the sources, and Tancred was 
seen as simply responding with a tit-for-tat.29 It is possible that 
the use of a Muslim ally to forcibly resolve a dispute with another 
Christian was damnable while enlisting help from the same kind 
of ally in self-defense was acceptable. The fact that Fulcher of 
Chartres claimed that God was on Tancred’s side, and Mathew 
attested to his piety, means that an alliance with Muslims was 
not by definition sinful. Some amount of internal negotiation 
was certainly necessary, however, to make religious ideology fit 
with political reality. could only justify their alliances with the 
opposite side by deeming them absolutely necessary.30 Language 
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explaining the need to avoid further bloodshed, secure vital 
trade routes, or protect Christians in a region always preambled 
contemporary descriptions of treaties concluded between 
Muslims and crusaders.31 The crusaders clearly viewed war as the 
default and thought that peace and alliances were possible but 
had to be justified within the context of their religious struggle. 
Holy war was flexible, but only if one had a good enough excuse. 
Perhaps Baldwin’s alliance failed to meet the test of sufficient 
necessity to be justified religiously, leading Matthew of Edessa to 
condemn him. On the other hand, Tancred’s alliance of mutual 
strategic self defense with Ridwan was acceptable enough to be 
divinely sanctioned. 
 The example of diplomatic relations between Antioch 
and Aleppo sheds light on the way Frankish and Muslim leaders 
interacted diplomatically after the First Crusade. The politically 
divided nature of Syria at the time of the Crusader’s arrival was 
key to their surprising success, and the nature of politics after the 
individual Frankish lords carved out territories for themselves. 
These territories were built on peace treaties concluded with 
defeated local rulers, which began the process of integrating the 
crusader states into the existing framework of medieval Syria 
and Palestine. Individual Muslim rulers also took the presence of 
new powerful actors as an opportunity to improve their fortunes 
and find potential allies. Similarly, desire for personal gain led 
to conflicts and rivalries between the Frankish leaders. Together, 
these factors led to instances of conflicting Frankish-Muslim 
alliances. Despite these trends, religion and holy war ideology 
were still central to the political motivations of crusaders. Personal 
gain did not exclude piety for the leaders of the First Crusade and 
their contemporaries. Similarly, alliances with Muslims could be 
accommodated within the crusading ethos as long as they were 
properly justified.
 The uneasy equilibrium established in medieval Palestine 
was punctuated both by the periodic arrivals of new Europeans 
in subsequent numbered Crusades as well as the rise of dominant 
150    Jake Mezey
Holy War by Other Means
Muslim powers with the ability to overturn the status quo. In the 
case of the Third Crusade (1188-1192) both factors were true. 
The consolidation of Syria and Egypt under Nur-al Din and 
Saladin led to the decisive defeat and capture of Jerusalem after 
the battle of Hattin in 1187. The threat to the Outremer and 
the loss of Jerusalem triggered the calling of the Third Crusade 
and the arrival of a large force primarily under the command of 
Richard I of England in 1191.32 The next year of warfare between 
Saladin and Richard proved bloody and militarily exhausting for 
both sides. Richard I and Saladin each repeatedly used diplomatic 
negotiations and overtures of peace as tools to attempt to gain an 
advantage over each other.  
 In 1191, Richard forced the capitulation of the city 
of Acre and Saladin engaged in lengthy negotiations over the 
surrender of the garrison using the supposed True Cross as a 
bargaining chip.33 Saladin may have been attempting to delay 
the crusaders’ march on Jerusalem and give him time to ready 
the city’s defenses. According to the Itinerarium Peregrinorum et 
Gesta Regis Ricardi, Richard eventually suspected Saladin’s tactics 
and decided to execute the Muslim prisoners he had taken en 
masse.34 This exchange highlights how Saladin used negotiations 
to gain a potential military advantage. Concluding a treaty with 
the enemy while looking to gain a future advantage corresponds 
with the acceptable role of negotiation under jihad or holy war.35 
Since Richard was in a position of strength, he felt no compulsion 
to spend time compromising with Saladin and instead chose to 
send a message as to how he would respond to future ploys. 
 Asbridge notes how Richard was capable of using similar 
negotiating tactics to gain an edge on his opponent. In September, 
Richard led his army south from Acre, and his route took him 
through the forest of Arsuf.36 Fearing an ambush by Saladin’s 
forces in the forest, Richard sent messengers to make contact 
and to negotiate a peace. Saladin agreed to the talks and sent his 
brother al-Adil as a negotiator. Saladin was waiting for a group 
of reinforcements to arrive, and therefore instructed his brother 
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to lengthen the negotiations as much as possible. When al-Adil 
and Richard met, however, the latter immediately demanded a 
full surrender of Saladin’s troops. Saladin’s brother rejected these 
terms, after which Richard immediately drew up his army into 
battle order and marched through the forest. Asbridge astutely 
concludes that calling the talks and immediately torpedoing 
them was a deliberate tactic on Richard’s part to catch Saladin 
unaware.37 Ibn Shaddad records that Saladin’s army was in no 
position to respond to this move and retreated in substantial 
disorder.38
 Both examples show how diplomatic negotiation served 
to further each side’s military position. Richard and Saladin 
played a delicate game of offering terms in weaker positions, not 
meant to be accepted, but to manipulate the other party into 
giving up an advantage. Later, Conrad of Montferrat, one of 
Richard’s subordinates, treacherously attempted to negotiate an 
alliance with Saladin. His plot never had much hope of being 
successful, but it put Richard in a far weaker position, as Saladin 
used it to try to force greater concessions from the English king. 
Richard responded by offering a marriage alliance between his 
sister Joan and Saladin’s brother al-Adil to jointly rule Jerusalem. 
This marriage would have run counter to both secular custom 
and religious law, but the offer diverted Saladin from conspiring 
with Conrad.39 Furthermore, Richard may have intended to sow 
distrust in the Ayyubid camp by offering the marriage to al-Adil, 
with whom he had developed a publicly friendly relationship, 
rather than al-Afdal, who was Saladin’s son and heir.40 
 During the Third Crusade, diplomacy was not opposed 
to the concept of holy war and jihad, but was simply another 
tool by which to wage it. The evidence of Richard’s and Saladin’s 
interactions throughout the conflict suggest no delineation 
of military and diplomatic measures into separate spheres. 
Debating the terms of an agreement could give crucial time for 
military forces to move into position. An opponent’s willingness 
to agree to negotiate might give valuable information about their 
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strength.41 Crusade and jihad were waged both on the battlefield 
and at the negotiating table. Politics did not necessarily serve 
as a sign of compromise on ideological grounds but functioned 
instead as a continuation of holy war by other means. 
 The fact that neither Saladin nor Richard were able to 
gain a decisive edge over each other made a diplomatic settlement 
between the two sides necessary. Ibn Shaddad recorded an early 
exchange between Richard and Saladin. Richard sent a message 
that claimed, “Jerusalem is the center of our worship which we 
will never renounce even if there were only one of us left.” Saladin 
replied by writing, “Let not the king imagine that we shall give 
it up, for we are unable to breathe a word of that amongst the 
Muslims.”42 Having begun the Third Crusade with the grand 
goal of recapturing Jerusalem for Christianity and restoring the 
territory of the crusader states, Richard was forced to accept the 
reality of negotiating for only minor gains. Similarly, Saladin 
was the most prominent proponent of jihad during the 12th 
century.43 Although he successfully captured Jerusalem, he was 
unable to fully expel the Frankish presence from the holy land. 
The inherently limited scope of a compromise acceptable to both 
sides represents a direct clash between reality and the directives of 
holy war. 
 How could these two leaders at ideological loggerheads 
and a military impasse negotiate a treaty? The highly temporary 
treaty they signed was perhaps the only solution. The terms of 
the agreement included the demolition of the fortifications of 
Ascalon, access to the Holy Sepulcher for Christian Pilgrims, and 
a coastal area of land between Tyre and Jaffa being granted to 
the crusader states, but the official language of the agreement 
was only a three-year truce.44 Neither leader could justify to 
their followers, or perhaps even to themselves, any kind of peace 
treaty meant to last eternally.45 A lasting agreement, however, was 
plainly a necessity for both parties. Richard I suffered from the 
combination of a demoralized army, lack of resources, political 
turmoil in England, and personal illness.46 However, he still 
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claimed that the reason for the three-year period for the truce 
was to give him one year to travel back to England, one year 
to organize fresh troops, and one year to return.47 Similarly, 
Ibn Shaddad claims that Saladin agreed to the truce in order to 
give his soldiers time to rest and strengthen the defenses of the 
city of Jerusalem.48 Neither of these things happened, however, 
as Richard was captured and held for ransom in Austria, and 
Saladin died in 1193. Instead, this three-year truce became the 
foundation of the last Latin kingdom in the holy land, which 
would persist for another century until the fall of Acre in 1291. 
Yvonne Friedman used the term “small peace” to accurately 
describe the kind of settlement produced by reconciling religious 
ideology with political reality.49 Only minor armistices were 
possible under the framework of holy war or jihad, mere breaks 
while each side marshalled its forces. It was, however, often the 
case that leaders repeatedly renewed and expanded these minor 
agreements to form a patchwork, uneasy, but often long-lasting 
peace. In this way, coexistence was possible even within the 
hostile and incompatible religious conflict of the Third Crusade.
The remaining Crusader states during the Third Crusade
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 Finally, what is often referred to as the Sixth Crusade 
was an utterly exceptional case of diplomacy, as the Holy 
Roman Emperor Frederick II and the Ayyubid Sultan of Egypt 
Al-Kamil nonviolently negotiated the exchange of Jerusalem. 
Before his journey to the holy land, Frederick II had been 
excommunicated by Pope Honorius the III for remaining in 
Europe and delaying his promise to go on crusade. Moreover, 
the Pope blamed Frederick for the failure of the Fifth Crusade 
in Egypt. However, in 1229, Fredrick sailed with his army to 
Acre where he negotiated the Treaty of Jaffa and Tel-Ajul with 
the ruler of Egypt, Al-Kamil. The treaty gave control of Jerusalem 
to Frederick and instituted a ten-year truce between Franks and 
Muslims in the Holy Land. In return, Frederick guaranteed free 
access and protection for Muslim pilgrims and support for Al-
Kamil against his rivals in Syria. Frederick’s ability to seize a 
diplomatic opportunity to retake Jerusalem without the use of 
force is unique in the history of the crusades, and it seems he 
saw no contradiction between the religious mandate of crusading 
and the use of negotiation to obtain his strategic goal without 
bloodshed. It could simply be that Frederick was lucky and that 
he happened to act under favorable political circumstances. 
While this is true, it does not explain how Frederick managed to 
bring himself to make an agreement that was nearly universally 
reviled by other Christians. I argue against one common position 
that Frederick negotiated with al-Kamil for non-religious reasons 
and merely out of political opportunism. I suggest instead that 
Frederick’s ability to reconcile his religious ideology with political 
and cultural cooperation allowed him to succeed in regaining 
control of Jerusalem in a way no other European figure in the 
period was able to.  
 Though perhaps partially motivated by self-interest, 
Frederick II’s decision to retake the city of Jerusalem was primarily 
motivated by religious conviction. Frederick II makes his piety 
abundantly clear in his letter to Henry III of England, writing: 
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 at length Jesus Christ, Son of God, beholding from on 
 high our devoted endurance and patient devotion to 
 his cause, in his merciful compassion of us at length 
 brought it about that the Sultan of Babylon [al-Kamil] 
 restored to us the holy city, the place where the feet of 
 Christ trod, and where the true worshippers adore the
 Father in spirit and in truth.50
Frederick may simply have been trying to win sympathy or praise 
from Henry and any other readers by portraying a religious exterior. 
That being said, however, Frederick’s repeated religious fervor 
in his letters indicates something more about his motivations, 
especially if other explanations fail to describe his actions. One 
common explanation of Frederick’s decision to go to the holy 
land was his marriage to Isabella of Brienne, who carried the title 
Queen of Jerusalem in 1225.51 This marriage technically made 
Frederick King of Jerusalem, which has led scholars to argue that 
claiming this particular crown led Frederick to go on crusade. 
However, after negotiating with al-Kamil and crowning himself, 
Frederick left the city, never to return. Furthermore, Frederick 
made no serious attempt to personally govern the city or extract 
revenue from it.52 Installing himself as King of Jerusalem, was 
clearly not Frederick’s primary motivation. Another explanation 
is that Frederick hoped to improve his reputation with the Pope 
or as a Christian in general by retaking Jerusalem. It is clear, 
however, that his actions only made Fredrick more unpopular 
with the general body of Christians, who supposedly pelted him 
with offal when he departed from Acre.53 Frederick’s negotiations 
also clearly did little to appease the Pope, who proceeded to call a 
crusade against him in 1248.54 This evidence together precludes 
the third argument that retaking Jerusalem made Frederick more 
powerful. Incurring the enmity of the vast majority of European 
Christians as well as having to fight off papal forces most likely 
caused more trouble for Frederick than if he had not gone on 
crusade at all. Based on this evidence, it is reasonable to conclude 
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that Frederick’s primary motivation for retaking Jerusalem was 
his religious conviction.
 If Frederick’s motivations were religious, how was he 
so comfortable negotiating with and making concessions to al-
Kamil, a Muslim ruler? Frederick’s upbringing as a youth on the 
island of Sicily was key to his early understanding of Islam and 
has been commented on by multiple sources.55 Growing up in 
an area and court life that certainly included Muslims, Frederick 
had to learn how to interact with members of another religion 
on a daily basis, even as he himself was expected to behave as a 
devout Christian. While nearly all previous Crusaders had little 
to no experience with the Islamic world, Frederick’s comfort in 
communicating across cultural lines was likely a key factor in 
the success of his relations with al-Kamil. Hiroshi Takayama 
analyzes the longstanding relationship between al-Kamil and 
Frederick that both preceded and outlasted the events of the 
Sixth Crusade. Seventeenth century accounts of inscriptions on 
the walls of the Cathedral of Cefalu suggest that Frederick might 
have sent envoys to al-Kamil as early as 1217.56 Furthermore, 
Frederick maintained such good relations with the Sultan that 
they frequently exchanged correspondence and even poetry after 
he had returned to Europe.57 This friendship may have been a 
crucial factor in the peaceful conclusion of the treaty of Jaffa and 
Tel-Ajul. The main reason al-Kamil offered Jerusalem to Frederick 
was to gain the Emperor’s support against Kamil’s brother al-
Muzzam.58 However, al-Muzzam died before Frederick’s arrival 
at Acre.59 Despite the disappearance of his main rival, al-Kamil 
still chose to conclude the treaty with Frederick. This decision 
runs explicitly counter to the established dynamic under which 
agreements between Frank and Muslim had to be justified by 
necessity. Thus, the success of the sixth Crusade was exceptional 
in that a Christian and Muslim ruler were able to reach an 
agreement purely diplomatically, which shocked the sensibilities 
of their coreligionists. The foundation of this agreement was the 
personal relationship built up over time between Frederick II and 
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al-Kamil. 
 
Painting of Frederick II (center left) meeting with Sultan Al-Kamil (center right)
 This paper has sought to highlight several trends in 
diplomatic negotiations between Christian and Muslim rulers 
during the Crusades. First, conducting diplomacy for personal 
gain was not seen as necessarily contradictory to the ideology of 
holy war. Crusaders and their Muslim counterparts incorporated 
the negotiation of treaties into their religious framework as the 
necessity arose. Diplomacy also served as both an extension of 
war and as the foundation of numerous small peace agreements 
that made coexistence in medieval Palestine and Syria possible. 
A crucial aspect of understanding the crusades historically is the 
examination of the balancing and reconciliation between abstract 
and unlimited religious ideology and the limited and complex 
political realities of war and peace. 
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